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Decisions are taken from Lawtel's Case Law database. LTL: Lawtel report; TLR: Times Law Reports; ILR: Independent Law Report.
Asylum appeal made before Immigration Act was in force
R v (1) The Secretary of State for the Home Department (2) A special adjudic ator, ex parte Nargis Chowdry (1998)
Court: CA (Lord Woolf MR, Potter LJ, May LJ) 2/2/9Appeal of the first respondent from the order of Mr Justice Carnwath of 16 December 1997 whereby he ordered that the applicant's application for judicial review be allowed and that the decisions under challenge be quashed. On 21 October 1996 the provisions of s.1 Asylum and Immigration Appeal Act 1996 came into force and substituted a new paragraph 5 of Schedule II in the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. This was a test case affecting others, the issue on appeal being whether the new paragraph 5 applied in circumstances where the claim for asylum was made prior to the coming into force of the new provision, but where certification took place after commencement. The applicant arrived in the UK from Pakistan on 10 December 1995 and claimed asylum. On 18 April 1997 the Secretary of State rejected the applicant's claim and certified it in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Schedule II of the 1993 Act as amended by the 1996 Act. On 22 April 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal which was rejected by the Special Adjudicator. On 18 November 1997 she applied for leave to move for judicial review which was granted by Mr Justice Carnwath on 10 December 1997. Judgment was given in the applicants favour on 16 December 1997. The Secretary of State appealed contending that the statutory provisions in force at the time the certification was made should have applied. The applicant contended that this amounted to a retrospective removal of her rights because the effect of the new paragraph 5 was to cut down on the right to appeal if the Special Adjudicator determined that the claim was without foundation.